Abstract. In this study we offer a new approach to proving the differentiability of the value function, which complements and extends the literature on dynamic programming. This result is then applied to the analysis of equilibrium in the recent class of monetary economies developed in [13] . For this type of environments we demonstrate that the value function is differentiable and this guarantees that the marginal value of money balances is well defined.
Introduction
This study develops two complementary objectives. First, it presents a new approach to proving the differentiability of the value function from dynamic programming. This initial result is then applied to the study of equilibrium for the recent class of monetary economies developed from the work in [13] . These economies present a natural example, but our differentiability result is of general applicability so our study contributes to a much wider literature in dynamic programming and macroeconomics.
To understand the thrust of our contribution, one should recall that in the typical dynamic economy the optimum lifetime utility of an agent is known as the value function. This function satisfies the classical Bellman equation and, in order to characterize and compute optima, it is often important to establish its differentiability. The common reference on this issue is the classical monograph [19] , where Theorem 4.11 presents a set of conditions for the differentiability of the Date: March 3, 2007. This research is supported in part by the NSF Grants SES-0128039, DMS-0437210, and ACI-0325846.
value function.
1 One of the conditions in this theorem is that, given the initial state x 0 , the value of the policy function g must be in the interior of the upper section of the constraint correspondence Γ, i.e., g(x 0 ) ∈ int Γ(x 0 ). One can imagine situations in which the value of the policy function is on the boundary of Γ. For instance, this may occur when agents are constrained in their ability to save or to borrow, as it happens in several monetary models. An additional difficulty is associated to the statement, in the proof of the theorem, that "since g(x 0 ) ∈ int Γ(x 0 ) and Γ is continuous, it follows that g(x 0 ) ∈ int Γ(x), for all x in some neighborhood of x 0 ;" see [19, p. 85] . According to the assumptions imposed in [19] , this claim does not seem to be substantiated. However, if the point (x 0 , g(x 0 )) is an interior point of the graph of the constraint correspondence Γ, then the claim is true. Indeed, in general, in most macroeconomic models this is the case. The observations above motivate the first objective of this study, i.e., to develop a novel formulation of the differentiability of the value function. Our formulation is based on a proof that bypasses the two difficulties noted above by making a less restrictive assumption. The key requisite is that the initial state x 0 be an interior point of the lower section of Γ at g(x 0 ), i.e., x 0 ∈ intΓ −1 (g(x 0 )).
We then present a application of this result to a model of money based on [13] . In the model, anonymous individuals face idiosyncratic trading shocks, sometimes being buyers and other times being sellers. This feature ensures an explicit role for money, but also causes individual money balances to evolve stochastically, with obvious drawbacks in analytical tractability (e.g., see [9, 11, 16] ). These are avoided by assuming quasilinear preferences, which eliminate of wealth effects and open the door to an equilibrium with a degenerate distribution of money holdings. In equilibrium everyone chooses identical savings and the optimal savings plan corresponds to a boundary solution in which agents hold equal shares of the money stock. The use of dynamic programming in such an economy presents two complications. First, quasilinearity leads to a period return function that is unbounded in the available real balances; this contrasts with the standard assumption in dynamic programming of a bounded return function (see [19] ). Second, one cannot apply the standard proof for the differentiability of the value function from [19] , because individual savings lie on the boundary of the graph of the constraint correspondence. Indeed, though this monetary literature normally supposes that the value function is differentiable, we are not aware of any specific paper establishing this differentiability. We solve the first complication by restricting the value function on bounded intervals. We solve the second problem by applying our differentiability result.
We structure the paper as follows. In Section 2 we start by describing a typical representative agent economy, which is the basic framework found in [19] . In Section 3 we introduce the value function and present simple proofs of two of its basic properties. Section 4 contains our main result concerning the differentiability of the value function. Finally, Section 5 presents an application of our proof of the differentiability of the value function to the model of money developed in [13] .
The Basic Dynamic Framework
The standard dynamic framework consists of an infinite horizon representative agent economy, where the representative agent can consume, produce, and save by accumulating some assets. In what follows we consider a deterministic framework where time is discrete, i.e., there are countably many periods labeled as t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . In each period t the agent must make a choice from a given opportunity set X, the elements of which define the states of the economy and can be interpreted as the stock of real assets or capital available in a given period. In making this choice the agent faces a constraint that is described by a nonempty-valued "constraint" correspondence Γ : X→ →X. Given that the state at the beginning of a period is x, the set Γ(x) is the set of feasible states at the end of the period.
As usual the graph of the correspondence Γ is denoted by G Γ , i.e.,
It is assumed that there exists a function F : G Γ → R known as the return (or utility) function. The value F (x, y) is interpreted as the payoff to the agent in a period that starts in state x and ends in state y.
A plan starting with x 0 ∈ X is a sequence x = (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , . . .) such that x t+1 ∈ Γ(x t ) holds for each t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The state of the economy at the beginning of period t + 1 is x t+1 which is chosen by the agent on period t given that the state at the beginning of period t was x t . The collection of all plans starting with x 0 is denoted Π(x 0 ). That is,
Since Γ is nonempty-valued, notice that Π(x 0 ) is a nonempty set for each x 0 ∈ X. It is assumed that agents have time-separable preferences and they discount future utility by a factor β, where 0 < β < 1. This means that given an initial state x 0 , the agent's lifetime utility is given by
In order to make U (x) well-defined, we impose the following convergence condition.
For each plan x the series
Note that for any given initial state x 0 the above formula defines a function U : Π(x 0 ) → R. Now given an initial state x 0 , the agent must choose a plan x ∈ Π(x 0 ) that maximizes his lifetime utility. In other words, given x 0 ∈ X, the agent must solve the optimization problem:
Any plan that solves the optimization problem (P) is called an optimal plan. When condition (C) is satisfied, a function-known as the value function-can be defined, which is associated with the optimization problem (P).
The Value Function
In this section we first recall the definition of the value function and then state (with proofs) two of its basic properties. In what follows we establish two well known basic properties of the value function that are needed to carry out our work. Specifically, the value function satisfies the functional equation known as the Bellman equation (see [6] ) and it is concave. We include the proofs of these statements both for completeness and because they differ from the standard proofs in [19] .
Lemma 3.2. The value function v is a solution of the Bellman equation. That is, for each
Proof. We must show that inequalities
are both true.
First, fix some x = (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , . . .) ∈ Π(x 0 ) and note that the plan z = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . .) belongs to Π(x 1 ). Now note that
This easily implies
. Let z 0 = y and then pick an arbitrary plan
This implies that
for all z ∈ Π(y). In other words, the real number
is an upper bound of the set
, from which we get
The second property that must be established is the concavity of the value function.
Proof. Let x 0 , y 0 ∈ X and 0 < α < 1. The convexity of X implies αx 0
Since G Γ is a convex set and (x t , x t+1 ), (y t , y t+1 ) ∈ G Γ for each t = 1, 2, . . ., it follows that
Now note that the concavity of F implies
Since this is true for all real numbers M and N with v(
. This shows that v is concave.
Notice that the above proof is perhaps simpler than the one in [19] , because it does not require the existence of an optimal plan. We now have the necessary background in order to present a new proof of the differentiability of the value function.
The Main Result
To develop the new proof of the differentiability of the value function, we start by letting ξ = (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ ) denote the arbitrary vector of the Euclidean space R . Now consider a function f : A → R, where A ⊆ R . The function f is said to be differentiable at a point a ∈ A if a is an interior point of A and there exist a neighborhood V ⊆ A of a and a vector q ∈ R such that
holds for all ξ ∈ V , where as usual lim ξ→a
3 It is well known from Calculus that the vector q (called the differential of f at a) is uniquely determined and coincides with the gradient of f at a, i.e.,
A vector p ∈ R is said to be a supergradient of f at a point a ∈ A if for each ξ ∈ A we have
The (possibly empty) collection of all supergradients of f at a is denoted ∂f (a) and called the superdifferential of f at a. That is,
It turns out that if f is a concave function (and so by definition A is also a convex set), the superdifferential of f is nonempty at any interior point of The following result that presents a sufficient condition of differentiability of convex and concave functions is due to Benveniste and Scheinkman [7] . 
If g is differentiable at ξ, then f is likewise differentiable at ξ and the differential of f coincides with the differential of g at ξ. In particular, we have
Proof. We also consider the functions f and g restricted to the open ball B of ξ. We know that the superdifferential of f is nonempty at ξ; see [1, Theorem 7.12, p. 265] . So, according to Theorem 4.1, it suffices to show that it is a singleton.
To this end, let p be a supergradient of f at ξ. That is, for all ξ ∈ B we have
Since f dominates the function g and f (ξ) = g(ξ), it follows from the preceding inequality that
holds for all ξ ∈ B. That is, p is a supergradient of g at ξ. Since g is differentiable at ξ, we infer that p = (
∂ξ ). This shows that p is uniquely determined and that the differential of f coincides with that of g at ξ.
We are now ready to present a result regarding the differentiability of the value function. Keep in mind here, that as mentioned in the introduction of this note, the usual assumption of the literature, g(x 0 ) ∈ intΓ(x 0 ) , will be replaced with the condition x 0 ∈ intΓ −1 (g(x 0 )). (1) x is an interior point of the lower section Γ −1 (y) = {x ∈ X : y ∈ Γ(x)} of Γ at y.
If the function H : 
Proof. The concavity of F guarantees that the function H restricted to N (i.e., the function
and note that L is concave and differentiable at x. Moreover, for each x ∈ N we have y ∈ Γ(x), and so
Clearly, v(x) = L(x) and, by Theorem 3.3, the value function v is concave. But then, according to Lemma 4.2, v is differentiable at x and for each i = 1, . . . , we have
∂ξi . Notice that if (x, y) satisfies property (3) of Theorem 4.3 and is an interior point of the graph G Γ of the correspondence Γ, then properties (1) and (2) are also automatically satisfied. Therefore, Theorem 4.3 has wider applicability than the existing theorems, and of course encompasses the case when the value of the policy function is in the interior of the graph of the constraint correspondence Γ.
An Application to Monetary Economics
In this section we present a natural application of the results from the previous section, which is offered by the monetary economics literature. In the economy we present, the value function is defined on the real money balances held by an individual, and it is differentiable even if the policy function does not satisfy the standard interiority assumption. To be precise, we demonstrate the use of our differentiability result for the monetary economy studied in [13] where the value function is generally treated as being differentiable though the optimal plan is a boundary solution.
Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. There is an infinite number of identical infinitelylived agents who consume two perishable goods, good 1 and good 2, and discount future utility with a factor β ∈ (0, 1). The perishable goods are traded in competitive markets, 1 and 2. These two markets open sequentially in each period. Preferences differ across periods. At the beginning of each period every agent is either a buyer or a seller with equal probability. It is assumed that a shock process partitions the agent population into two "equal" parts, called buyers and sellers. 5 Output is sold on competitive spatially separated markets composed by many anonymous agents as in [2] . Buyers cannot produce good 1, but derive u 1 (c) utility from c ≥ 0 consumption of good 1. Sellers do not wish to consume good 1 but can produce y ≥ 0 of good 1 by suffering disutility y. Every agent derives u 2 (q) utility from consuming q ≥ 0 of good 2 and can produce h ≥ 0 of good 2 suffering disutility h. We assume that each utility function u i : [0, ∞) → R satisfies the Inada conditions. 6 Since each u i is a strictly decreasing continuous function, the Inada conditions guarantee that the equations u 1 (c) = 1 and u 2 (q) = 1 have unique solutions. That is, there exist unique quantities c * and q * such that u 1 (c * ) = 1 and u 2 (q * ) = 1.
There is an authority that supplies fiat currency and sets monetary policy starting with the money stockM 0 > 0. LetM t denote the stock at the start of period t. Monetary policy is a timeinvariant gross rate of growth γ > β for the money stock, publicly announced. It is implemented via a deterministic per capita lump-sum cash transfer in market 2. So,M t+1 = γM t is the cash available at the end of period t. Since sellers do not wish to consume, goods are non-storable and anonymity rules out credit, sellers in market 1 will demand cash compensation. Cash can also be used to trade in market 2. We let p 1,t and p 2,t denote the nominal prices of consumption in markets 1 and 2, respectively, on period t. Also, we work with real variables, defined to be the ratio of a nominal variable to p 2,t . Thus, we let p t = p 1,t p 2,t denote the real price of goods in market 1 and letM t p 2,t =m t denote the real money stock available at the start of period t. We denote by m t ≥ 0 the real balances held by an arbitrary agent at the start of period t. 7 5 If the population of agents is countable, then to each agent j ∈ N we assign a weight w j so that
. So, we can consider "even" agents as buyers and "odd" ones as sellers, assuming that at the beginning of each period a shock reassigns agents to buyers and sellers, so that the above weight equation is valid.
One way of doing this is by randomly exchanging the roles (buyer and seller) between each pair (2j − 1, 2j). Replacing u by u − u(0), we can assume without loss of generality that u(0) = 0. In what follows we consider allocations in which money is valued and aggregate real money balances are constant over time. Stationarity requiresm t =m in each period t, and therefore p2,t+1 p2,t =M t+1 M t = γ, i.e., the gross inflation rate is deterministic and equal to γ. Finally, we let τ = (γ − 1)m denote the real balance transfer in each period t.
The timing is as follows. The representative agent starts in market 1 with real balances m. Then, shocks are realized and the agent ends up in one of two states, buyer or seller. Trade and production takes place in market 1, and then market 2 opens. At this point in time, the agent has m j,t money balances, where j ∈ {b, s} reflects his market 1 activities and b denotes a buyer and s a seller. Subsequently, the agent receives the money transfer and production and trade takes place in market 2. Then, a new period starts. p2,t+1 =M t p2,t =m for each t = 1, 2 . . . . We will define by X = R + the set of possible real balance holdings of the agent. At the start of a period t, the agent has m t ∈ X real balances available. During the course of the period, the agent will have to select savings m t+1 ∈ Γ(m t ) = [0,m] for the next period. We explain how this is done, below. For now, notice that the constraint correspondence Γ : X→ →X must satisfy Γ(m t ) = [0,m] for each m t ∈ X because there cannot be short selling of money, i.e., m t cannot be negative and the supply of real balances is bounded above bym.
In market 1, if the agent is a buyer, i.e., j = b, then given the relative price p t he can consume c t ∈ [0, m t pt ] goods. If he is a seller, i.e., j = s, then he can produce y t ≥ 0. The agent enters market 2 with m b,t = m t −p t c t real balances if he was a buyer in market 1 and with m s,t = m t +p t y t if he was a seller. Each agent also receives τ =m(γ −1), constant over time. Each agent in market 2 can consume q j,t ≥ 0 and produce h j,t ≥ 0. Therefore, the resource constraint in market 2 is
and it holds with equality due to non-satiation. Since we need h j,t ≥ 0 we will work under the conjecture that the right-hand side of the equation above is non-negative. Conditions for this to occur, in an optimum, is (u 2 ) −1 (1) sufficiently large. Notice also that we are conjecturing that m t+1 does not depend on j, which is without loss in generality because preferences are quasilinear.
(For details about these claims see [13] .)
We will concentrate on monetary competitive equilibria, in terms of the given price vector (p 1,t , p 2,t ) ∞ t=0 . We carry out the analysis under the assumption that everyone starts each period with identical real balances; for a justification of this assumption see the discussion in [13] . Within this context, we wish to define an optimal plan for the representative agent. Any such plan will involve sequences of consumption and production in markets 1 and 2 as well as choices of savings by means of money holdings. To simplify the discussion of the optimal plan, it is convenient to make four remarks all of which deal with the choices of consumption and production in a period for the representative agent. The key observation, at this point, is that these choices are intratemporal in nature.
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(1) At the start of each period t the expected utility of the agent is
So, if we substitute the budget constraint from (5.1), then we get the following expression for the period expected utility: Given the four observations above, we are left to deal with the intertemporal choices, i.e., the choices of money holdings. To this end, we define the expected period utility F : X × X → R by
This plays the role of the period return function discussed earlier. It is not difficult to see that the real function f (x) = u 1 (min{x, c * }) − min{x, c * }, x ≥ 0, is concave, and from this it easily follows that the expected period utility function F (x, y) satisfies the following four important properties:
(1) is a concave continuous function, (2) is an unbounded function that satisfies the convergence condition (C), (3) for each fixed savings choice m t+1 ∈ [0, ∞) the function F (x, m t+1 ) is differentiable at each x > 0, and (4) for each m t > 0 we have
8 For more background and more details concerning the statements that follow, see the discussion in [4, 13] . As before, we define the lifetime utility for an agent who starts with real balances m 0 by
The objective of the representative agent is to choose an optimal monetary savings plan m that solves our standard lifetime utility maximization problem:
We discuss this maximization problem in detail, next.
The value function.
As shown in the previous section, the maximization problem of the representative agent has a corresponding value function v :
This value function satisfies the Bellman equation, that is, for each x ∈ X we must have:
Our objective is to show that v is continuous and differentiable. Since F is clearly a continuous function, we have that if v were continuous, then it would follow that for every x > 0 there exists at least one y ∈ Γ(x) such that v(x) = F (x, y) + βv(y). So, our task now is to prove that the value function v is indeed continuous.
In 
where (using the triangle inequality) the constant k is given by
This yields |v(m 0 )| ≤ It is easy to see that T is a contraction with contraction constant β. This implies that T has a unique fixed point, which (according to Lemma 3.2) must be the value function v restricted to I. Now an easy application of the classical Berge's Maximum Theorem (see for instance [1, p. 570]) shows that T leaves C b (I) invariant, i.e., T (C b (I)) ⊆ C b (I), which implies that T has also a fixed point in C b (I). But this fixed point of T in C b (I) must be the function v restricted to I. We conclude that v restricted to I is continuous, as desired.
We are now ready to discuss the differentiability of the value function. the point x > 0 is an interior point of the lower section of Γ at y, i.e., x ∈ intΓ −1 (y). Therefore, it follows from Theorem 4.3 that the value function given in (5.2) is differentiable at every real balance level x > 0 that the agent finds himself holding at the start of a period. It should be noted here that due to market clearing we have in general y =m. That is to say, agents hold all of the available money stock, in equal amounts. In this case, (x, y) / ∈ int G Γ , and so it is not obvious that the differentiability theorem in [19] can be applied. However, our Theorem 4.3 shows not only that v is differentiable on (0, ∞) but also that for each real balance level x > 0 we have: That is to say, one can easily calculate the marginal value of real balances even if the optimal savings plan is a boundary solution.
Concluding Remarks
The study of macroeconomic equilibrium is often based on the use of dynamic programming techniques. In this context, if the value function is differentiable, then it is possible to characterize the equilibrium allocation and the policy function in a simple manner. The classical reference on establishing the differentiability of the value function is in [19] , where Theorem 4.11 presents a proof based on the assumption that the policy function is in the interior of the upper section of the constraint correspondence. Two difficulties are associated to this approach. First, there are instances in which the optimal plan is a boundary solution, as in some monetary models where agents are constrained in their saving/borrowing abilities. Second, one must first establish that the policy function is also in the interior of the upper section of the constraint correspondence for all states that are in some neighborhood of the initial state. The new approach we have developed bypasses these two difficulties. It relies on an assumption for the initial state, and not for the policy function; one simply must ensure that the initial state is an interior point of the lower section of the constraint correspondence. The resulting proof of differentiability of the value function is simpler and of general applicability.
